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Market Access, the New Approach and Private Law
Barend VAN LEEUWEN*
Abstract: In James Elliott and Schmitt, the ECJ refused to extend the scope of
application of European standards adopted under the New Approach to private law
disputes. This article argues that the ECJ’s judgments were based on a static inter-
pretation of the concept of market access, which is inconsistent with how the concept
of market access has been developed in free movement of goods cases under Article 34
TFEU. It argues for a more consistent and dynamic interpretation of market access.
Such an approach would bring private liability cases like James Elliott and Schmitt
within the scope of application of EU law. As a result, the conditions and requirements
for liability in private law could be reviewed by the ECJ. If the ECJ is not willing to
extend the scope of application of the New Approach in this way, the EU legislature
should include rules on private liability in the directives adopted under the New
Approach.
Résumé: Dans les affaires James Elliott and Schmitt, la CJUE a refusé d’étendre le
champ d’application des standards européens adoptés dans le cadre de la Nouvelle
Approche des contentieux de droit privé. Cet article suggère que les arrêts de la CJUE
se basent sur une interprétation statique du concept d’accès au marché, une
interprétation qui ne correspond pas au concept développé dans les arrêts relatifs à
la libre circulation des biens suivant l’article 34 TFUE. Cet article défend une
interprétation cohérence et dynamique de l’accès au marché. Une telle approche
placerait les cas de contentieux privé comme Elliott and Schmitt dans le champ
d’application du droit européen. Par conséquent, les conditions et exigences de
responsabilité en droit privé pourraient être examinées par la CJUE. Si cette
dernière n’est pas disposée à étendre le champ d’application de la Nouvelle
Approche de cette manière, le législateur européen devrait inclure des règles sur la
responsabilité privée dans les directives adoptées dans le cadre de la Nouvelle
Approche.
Zusammenfassung: In James Elliott und Schmitt lehnte es der EuGH ab den
Anwendungsbereich europäischer Normen, die unter dem “Neuen Konzept” erlassen
wurden auf private Rechtsstreitigkeiten auszuweiten. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert,
dass diese EuGH-Rechtsprechung, die auf einer statischen Auslegung des Konzepts
des Marktzugangs beruhte, nicht im Einklang mit der Entwicklung des Konzepts des
Marktzugangs in der Rechtsprechung zur freien Warenfreiheit nach Artikel 34 AEUV
steht. Es wird für eine einheitlichere und dynamischere Auslegung des Konzepts des
Marktzugangs plädiert. Ein solcher Ansatz würde privatrechtliche Haftungsfälle wie
Elliott und Schmitt dem Anwendungsbereich des EU-Rechts unterstellen. Somit
könnten die Voraussetzungen und Bedingungen für die Haftung vom EuGH
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überprüft werden. Falls der EuGH nicht bereit ist, den Anwendungsbereich des
“Neuen Konzepts” auf diese Weise auszuweiten, sollte der EU-Gesetzgeber Regeln
für die privatrechtliche Haftung in den Richtlinien zum “Neuen Konzept”
aufnehmen.
1. Introduction
1. In two recent judgments, James Elliott1 and Schmitt,2 the Court of Justice of
the EU (‘the Court’) had to consider the impact of the New Approach, the EU’s
regulatory framework to improve the free movement of goods, on private law
claims arising after products had been placed on the market. The New Approach
has given an important role to the European standardization organizations,
which adopt the standards with which goods have to comply before they can
be placed on the market. In James Elliott, the Court held that it was competent
to interpret these harmonized standards in a preliminary reference brought
under Article 267 TFEU. The judgment was seen as revolutionary, because the
Court was prepared to interpret standards which have been developed by private
standardization organizations.3 Schmitt was considerably less revolutionary,
since the Court held that EU law does not require that certification bodies,
which verify if manufacturers comply with the relevant European standards, can
be held liable to end-users of products covered by the New Approach if they
have acted negligently in the certification procedure.4 Nevertheless, the Court
recognized that the aim of the involvement of certification bodies is to protect
the health of end-users of products.
2. This article will argue that, from the perspective of private law, the judg-
ment in James Elliott was not revolutionary at all. The Court was unwilling to
extend the scope of application of the New Approach to private law disputes
which arise after products have been placed on the market. Therefore, it is not
necessary for national courts to make a preliminary reference on the interpreta-
tion of European standards in private law disputes. After all, the European
1 ECJ 27 October 2016, C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Ltd v Irish Asphalt Ltd, ECLI:EU:
C:2016:821.
2 ECJ 16 February 2017, C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, ECLI:
EU:C:2017:128
3 See A. VOLPATO, ‘Harmonised Standards before the ECJ’, 54. CML Rev 2017, p 591 and A. VAN
WAEYENBERGE & D. RESTREPO AMARILES, ‘James Elliott Construction: a New(ish) Approach to Judicial
Review of Standardisation’, 42. EL Rev 2017, p 882.
4 See P. VERBRUGGEN & B. VAN LEEUWEN, ‘The Liability of Notified Bodies under the EU’s New
Approach: The Implications of the PIP Breast Implants Case’, 43. EL Rev 2018, p 394 and A.
WALLERMAN, ‘Pie in the Sky when you Die? Civil Liability of Notified Bodies under the Medical
Devices Directive’, 55. CML Rev 2018, p 265. See also GLINSKI & ROTT in this issue (with further
references).
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standard does not have a direct impact on the outcome of the dispute. A
similarly restrictive interpretation of the impact of the New Approach on private
law can be seen in Schmitt. It will be argued that both judgments are based on a
static concept of market access, which is only concerned with the initial placing
on the market of products. This concept of market access under the New
Approach is inconsistent with how market access has been developed by the
Court under Article 34 TFEU. Because the New Approach and Article 34 TFEU
both aim to facilitate free movement of goods, a more consistent interpretation
of market access should be adopted. Moreover, the effective application of the
New Approach requires that European standards have an impact on private law
rules. A direct link between the New Approach and private law will help to
improve free movement of goods in the internal market.
3. The argument in this article will be developed in three steps. First, it will
be shown that both James Elliot and Schmitt are based on a static concept of
market access (2). Second, this approach to market access is inconsistent with
the Court’s case law under Article 34 (3). Third, a more integrated approach
to market access under the New Approach and Article 34 TFEU is necessary.
Such an approach would require that the scope of application of the New
Approach is extended to private law disputes (4). If the Court remains unwill-
ing to make this link, the European legislature should be encouraged to
include rules on private law liability in the legislation adopted under the
New Approach.
2. Market Access Under the New Approach
2.1. James Elliott
4. James Elliott was a sale of goods case. The Irish building company James Elliott
concluded a contract with Irish Asphalt for the sale of Clause 804 aggregate – a
particular kind of concrete used in construction – which was to be used in building
a school in Dublin. After the completion of the building works, it was discovered
that the aggregate contained pyrite, which caused damage to the concrete floors
and ceilings. As a result, James Elliott had to carry out a significant amount of
remedial work. The company subsequently brought a case against Irish Asphalt for
breach of contract. Under the Irish Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980,
where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied
condition that the goods supplied under the contract are of merchantable quality
and are reasonably fit for purpose.5 The Irish High Court held that the European
standard for construction products, adopted under the New Approach, had to be
used in deciding whether these terms had been complied with. It found that there
5 S. 10 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980.
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had been a breach of contract because the aggregate did not satisfy the require-
ments of the European standard. The breach of the European standard was used in
support of the finding that there had been a breach of contract. It was in this
contractual context that, on appeal, the Irish Supreme Court made a preliminary
reference to the Court.
5. In understanding James Elliott, it should be recalled that, on a first impression,
the New Approach does not appear to be concerned with the harmonization of
national contract law. The EU developed the New Approach as a regulatory frame-
work to improve the free movement of goods in the internal market.6 The EU
adopts general product safety directives, which are supplemented with European
standards that ‘fill in’ the technical specifications which products have to comply
with. These harmonized European standards are adopted by one of the European
standardization organizations. If manufacturers comply with the relevant European
standard, it is presumed that they also satisfy the ‘essential requirements’ of the
directive. As such, establishing compliance with the European standard has become
the main mechanism for manufacturers to prove that they comply with the
European legislation. If they are able to show this, they can lawfully place their
products on the market.
6. In James Elliott, the relevant directive was Directive 89/106.7 Article 2(1)
confirms that construction products can only be placed on the market if they are
fit for their intended use, which means that they satisfy the essential requirements
under the Directive. It is not difficult to make a link between the concept of
‘fitness for use’ in Article 2(1) of Directive 89/106 and the implied condition of
‘fitness for purpose’ and ‘merchantable quality’ in the Irish Sale of Goods Act
1980. This is precisely what the Irish courts had done in their interpretation of
the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980. Nevertheless, the Court of
Justice declined to impose this link as a matter of EU law. The concept of fitness
for purpose under Directive 89/106 was kept separate from the concept of fitness
for purpose under the Irish Sale of Goods Act. EU law did not require that the
European standard was used to determine whether there had been a breach of
contract.
7. The Court’s judgment made it clear that, from the perspective of EU law,
compliance with the European harmonized standard is only required for manufac-
turers to be able to place their products on the market. In other words, Irish
Asphalt had to show that the aggregate complied with the relevant European
6 For a more detailed explanation of the New Approach, see H. SCHEPEL, The Constitution of Private
Governance (Oxford: Hart 2005) and B. VAN LEEUWEN, European Standardisation of Services and its
Impact on Private Law (Oxford: Hart 2017).
7 Directive 89/109 on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the
Member States relating to construction products.
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standard at the moment when it was placed on the Irish market. The role that the
European standard played in a contractual dispute which arose after the product
had been placed on the market was not regulated by the New Approach. The Court
held that the European standard did not determine the method for establishing the
conformity of the product with the contractual specifications.8 Similarly, it held
that national courts were under no obligation imposed by EU law to apply the
presumption of fitness under the Directive to the contractual dispute.9
8. As a result, from a private law perspective, the revolutionary impact of the
judgment is significantly restricted. The Court held that it is competent under
Article 267 TFEU to provide an interpretation of harmonized European stan-
dards adopted under the New Approach. At the same time, it held that the
interpretation or application of a European standard in a contractual dispute is
not a matter of EU law. Therefore, it is not necessary for national courts to ask
the Court questions about the interpretation of European standards in private
law cases. This makes it significantly less likely that national courts will make
references on the interpretation of European standards in private law disputes.
The only type of cases in which preliminary references might be necessary are
administrative law cases – for example, where the public authorities in a
Member State are refusing to allow a particular product to be placed on the
market because they claim that the product does not comply with the relevant
European standard. This is precisely what happened in the recent case of
Anstar,10 in which the Finnish authorities refused to allow Anstar’s construction
products to be placed on the Finnish market. It explains why the judgment in
James Elliott has been regarded as revolutionary from an administrative law
perspective.11 However, from the perspective of private law, the judgment in
James Elliott cannot be regarded as a revolution. This does not mean that
European standards play no role in private law. National courts regularly rely
on European standards to determine the appropriate contractual standard of
care or the required standard of care in tort cases based on fault.12 However,
James Elliott makes it clear that the application of European standards to
contractual disputes is not imposed – or even controlled – by EU law.
8 C-613/14, James Elliott (n 1), para. 53.
9 Ibid., at para. 61.
10 ECJ 14 December 2017, C-630/16, Anstar Oy, ECLI:EU:C:2017:971.
11 See M. ELIANTONIO, ‘Judicial Control of the EU Harmonized Standards: Entering a Black Hole?’, 44.
LIEI (Legal issues of Economic Integration) 2017, p 395.
12 See H. SCHEPEL, Constitution of Private Governance, Ch. 4. See also F. CAFAGGI, ‘Private Regulation
in European Private Law’, in A. Hartkamp et al. (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code (Alphen
aan de Rijn: Kluwer 2011), pp 91–126.
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2.2. Schmitt
8. A similarly restrictive interpretation of the impact of the New Approach on
private law can be seen in Schmitt, which was a tort law case. Elisabeth Schmitt was
a German woman who had received breast implants which had possibly been
manufactured by the French PIP factory. For a significant period of time, PIP had
used substandard industrial silicone gel in producing the breast implants. Breast
implants are covered by the New Approach – more precisely, by the Medical Devices
Directive.13 PIP’s fraud meant that their implants did not actually comply with the
relevant European standard. However, the fraud was never discovered by the
certification body TÜV Rheinland (‘TÜV’), which was responsible for the confor-
mity assessment procedure to verify that the breast implants complied with the
European standard. As a result, PIP was able to continue to place its products on
the market. Because the factory had gone bankrupt, Ms Schmitt decided to bring a
case against the certification body which had been responsible for the conformity
assessment procedure. She brought a damages claim against TÜV and submitted
that it had been negligent in performing the conformity assessment procedure
under the New Approach.
9. The main questions for the German court were whether TÜV owed a duty of care
to the recipients of breast implants, like Ms Schmitt, and whether it had breached that
duty of care. Under German law, TÜV could be found to owe a duty of care to Ms
Schmitt if the conformity assessment procedure was intended to protect end-users like
Ms Schmitt.14 The lower German courts held that TÜV had not acted to protect end-
users, because the focus of its certification activities was on facilitating the manufac-
turer in placing its products on the market.15 Therefore, TÜV did not owe a duty of
care to Ms Schmitt in tort. Moreover, they held that TÜV had not acted negligently in
performing the conformity assessment procedure. The German Supreme Court
decided to make a preliminary reference and asked whether certification bodies
under the New Approach act with the aim to protect end-users, whether the Medical
Devices Directive required that notified bodies could be held liable to end-users, and
whether TÜV had breached its obligations under the Medical Devices Directive.
10. The Court of Justice held that, in addition to facilitating free movement of
goods in the internal market, the aim of the involvement of certification bodies in
the New Approach is also to protect the end-users of products.16 However, the New
13 Directive 93/42 concerning medical devices.
14 For more background, see B. VAN LEEUWEN, ‘PIP Breast Implants, the EU’s New Approach for Goods
and Market Surveillance by Notified Bodies’, 5. EJRR 2014, p 338.
15 Landgericht Frankenthal (Pfalz) 14 March 2013, 6 O 304/12, ECLI:DE:
LGFRAPF:2013:0314.6O304.12.0A, and Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken 30 January 2014, 4 U
66/13, ECLI:DE:POLGZWE:2014:0130.4U66.13.0A.
16 C-219/15, Schmitt (n 2), para. 53.
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Approach does not require that certification bodies can be held liable in tort. In
other words, liability in tort law is not imposed as a matter of EU law. For that
reason, the conditions under which certification bodies can be held liable in
negligence under national law are not regulated by EU law.17 Nevertheless, they
have to comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.18 Finally, the
Court held that notified bodies were not obliged to carry out unannounced inspec-
tions, to examine devices or to examine the manufacturer’s business records.19 The
Court knew that its finding that the aim of the involvement of certification bodies
in the New Approach was to protect end-users was sufficient for the German
Supreme Court to establish a duty of care under German law. It also knew that it
was unlikely that the German court would found a breach of TÜV’s duty of care in
light of the Court’s judgment.20
11. The Court’s conclusion that the Medical Devices Directive did not require
that certification bodies could be held liable in tort was to a significant extent based
on its judgment in Paul.21 In that case, the Court held that a directive on banking
supervision did not require that public supervisory agencies in the banking sector
could be held liable to individual victims for breaches of the directive. It relied on
two justifications in support of this conclusion: first of all, the directive itself did
not provide for the liability of public supervisory agencies in case of non-compli-
ance; secondly, State liability was not necessary to guarantee the effective applica-
tion of the directive.22 In Schmitt, the Court only focussed on the first justification.
The Medical Devices Directive does not expressly impose liability on certification
bodies. The more fundamental question of whether the effectiveness of the New
Approach required that certification bodies could be held liable to end-users in tort
was not addressed by the Court. Its conclusion was that the liability of certification
bodies remained a matter of national law.
12. In Schmitt, we can observe a similar unwillingness on the part of the Court to
extend the impact of the New Approach to private law. Even though certification
bodies have a monitoring role after a product has been placed on the market, since
they have to ensure that manufacturers still comply with the European standard,
17 Ibid., at para. 59.
18 For an analysis of why the Court held that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness were
applicable to this case, see P. VERBRUGGEN & B. VAN LEEUWEN, 43. EL Rev 2018, pp 401–402, and A.
WALLERMAN, 55. CML Rev 2018, p 275.
19 Ibid., at para. 48.
20 Indeed, the Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court) rejected Ms Schmitt’s claim on the basis
that TÜV had not breached its obligations under the New Approach: Bundesgerichtshof, 22 June
2017, VII ZR 36/14, ECLI:DE:BGH:2017:220617UVIIZR36.14.0.
21 ECJ 12 October 2004, C-222/02, Peter Paul and others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:
C:2004:606.
22 Ibid., at paras 42–47.
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their activities are limited to guaranteeing that manufacturers continue to have the
right to place their product on the market. The potential liability of certification
bodies in the New Approach remains a question of national law. More fundamen-
tally, the Court was not willing to analyse to what extent the effective application of
the New Approach requires that certification bodies can be held liable in tort as a
matter of EU law.
2.3. A Static Concept of Market Access
13. A number of parallels between James Elliott and Schmitt can be identified. In
both cases, the Court of Justice adopted a narrow perspective on the scope of the
New Approach. More precisely, the impact of the New Approach on private law was
restricted. The Court was unwilling to extend the impact of the New Approach
beyond the question of whether products could be lawfully placed on the market.
The application of European standards in contract law and the liability of certifica-
tion bodies in tort law remain regulated by national law with little or no EU law
control. This approach to the impact of the New Approach on private law is based
on a static vision of market access in the internal market. Furthermore, it is based
on a restrictive vision of the role that private law plays in facilitating market access.
It will be argued below that this static concept of market access under the New
Approach is inconsistent with how the Court of Justice has developed the concept
of market access in its case law under Article 34 TFEU. Moreover, it will be argued
that it is inconsistent with the role that the EU has given to private law in
strengthening the internal market and in facilitating free movement. This theme
will be returned to in the final section. First, it is necessary to analyse in more
detail how and why the judgments in James Elliott and Schmitt are based on a static
concept of market access.
14. In both judgments, the Court of Justice construed the concept of market
access under the New Approach as restricted to the placing on the market of
products. The ‘reach’ of the New Approach does not extend beyond this initial
stage. Essentially, this means that the New Approach is seen as an administrative
law project. It regulates the relationship between manufacturers of products and
the public authorities in the Member State where they want to place their product
on the market. These public authorities cannot obstruct the placing on the market
of products which comply with the essential requirements of the relevant directive.
If products comply with the European standard, it is presumed that they also
comply with the essential requirements of the directive. However, once the pro-
ducts have been placed on the market, the New Approach no longer regulates or
assists the manufacturer. In particular, this means that the role that the European
standard plays in private law is not regulated by EU law. There is no direct link
between the New Approach and private law.
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15. This is a static interpretation of the role of the New Approach and of the
concept of market access, since it presumes that national rules which regulate the
use of a product after it has been placed on the market do not have a direct impact
on market access. In James Elliott, the relevant directive was Directive 89/106. The
first paragraph of Article 6(1) of the same Directive provides that ‘Member States
shall not impede the free movement, placing on the market or use in their territory
of products which satisfy the provisions of this directive’. As such, it is clear that
the use of products in the territory of the Member States cannot be obstructed
under the New Approach. The second paragraph of Article 6(1) goes on to say that
‘Member States shall ensure that the use of such products, for the purpose of which
they are intended, shall not be impeded by rules or conditions imposed by public
bodies or private bodies acting as a public undertaking or acting as a public body on
the basis of a monopoly position’. This last addition emphasizes the potential role
of competition law in facilitating market access, while the first paragraph high-
lights the role of the free movement provisions.23 Because of the static view of
market access under the New Approach, national rules which impede the use of
products after they have been placed on the market should be assessed under the
free movement provisions or competition law. In other words, the scope of positive
integration through the New Approach is limited to the initial market access stage.
16. As a result, in James Elliott, the concept of ‘fitness for use’ under Article 2(1)
of Directive 89/106 did not have a direct impact on the concept of ‘fitness for
purpose’ under the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980. From the
perspective of manufacturers, this makes little business sense. They have to ensure
that their products comply with the European standard before they can be placed
on the market, but this standard does not have to be used to assess their fitness for
use in private law disputes which arise after the products have been placed on the
market. However, without an express agreement between the seller and buyer, it is
difficult to see why a product should suddenly be expected to comply with a
different standard in private law. If the product was fit for use when it was placed
on the market, why would it not be fit for purpose when it was actually being used?
Moreover, in cases like James Elliott, where the aggregate was supplied to be used
in construction work, the distinction between the placing on the market of the
aggregate and its use appears artificial and difficult to demarcate in practice. If
Irish law required the aggregate in James Elliott to comply with additional and
more stringent standards than those contained in the European standard in a
contractual dispute, these requirements could be regarded as an obstacle to free
movement under Article 34 TFEU. This would have a negative impact on the access
23 For an analysis of the interaction between the New Approach and competition law, see B.
LUNDQVIST, Standardization under EU Competition Rules and US Antitrust Rules (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar 2014).
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to the market of products which complied with the European standard. As a result,
the effectiveness of the New Approach would be compromised. Similarly, in
Schmitt, the refusal of the Court to impose the possibility of liability of certification
bodies under the New Approach could have an impact on the willingness of
consumers to buy products covered by the New Approach. If consumers cannot
hold certification bodies liable for having acted negligently in the certification
procedure, this could mean that they are less willing to buy a product. Consumer
confidence plays an important role in the way in which market access has been
interpreted under Article 34 TFEU.
17. Overall, it can be concluded that the scope of the New Approach has been
restricted to a static interpretation of market access. As a result, there is no EU-law
control beyond the initial market access stage. This might not be sufficient to
guarantee the effective application of the New Approach. Moreover, it is not
consistent with the dynamic approach to market access which the Court has
developed in its case law under Article 34 TFEU. If this concept of market access
is applied to private law cases for products covered by the New Approach, it would
increase the effectiveness of the EU’s regulatory framework. It would require a
more flexible and more integrated approach to positive integration through the
New Approach and negative integration under Article 34 TFEU. Before this inte-
grated approach will be analysed in more detail in the last section, we will first look
at how the Court has interpreted the concept of market access in its case law under
Article 34 TFEU.
3. Market Access Under Article 34 TFEU
3.1. Keck
18. There is a close relationship between the creation of the New Approach and
the Court’s case law under Article 34 TFEU. The judgment in Cassis de Dijon,24 in
which the Court introduced the principle of mutual recognition and the concept of
mandatory requirements, provided an important impetus to the EU to develop the
New Approach. National product standards which required products to comply with
an additional or different set of standards from the Member State where they had
been produced were held to be measures having equivalent effect under Article 34
TFEU. If the EU wanted to deal effectively and efficiently with the variety of
national product standards that existed in the Member States, it had to come up
with a new regulatory approach to remove obstacles to free movement.25 Negative
integration through Article 34 TFEU alone was not sufficiently effective.
Harmonization of laws on the basis of Article 114 TFEU was a long and
24 ECJ 20 February 1979, C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42.
25 See H. SCHEPEL, Constitution of Private Governance, pp 63–69.
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complicated political process, which was not sufficiently efficient to deal with rapid
technological developments in the field of goods. For that reason, the EU decided
to outsource the technical aspects of the standard-setting for products to European
standardization. Therefore, there is a close link between the New Approach and
Article 34 TFEU. Both regulatory tools play an important and complementary role
in improving the free movement of goods in the internal market. The aim of this
section is to show that, despite the parallel aims of the New Approach and Article
34 TFEU, the concept of market access under Article 34 TFEU has been developed
in a way which is different from the Court’s approach in James Elliott and Schmitt.
19. In its early case law under Article 34 TFEU, the focus of the Court was on
product requirements. Because of the broad definition of a measure having equiva-
lent effect established by the Court in Dassonville,26 traders increasingly tried to
rely on Article 34 TFEU to challenge a variety of national rules that they regarded
as obstacles to free movement. This line of cases, with the Sunday Trading Saga as
the main example,27 revealed the increasing tension between the interests of
businesses, which were trying to use Article 34 TFEU as a tool to challenge national
rules that were restrictive of trade, and the interests of the Member States, which
wanted to maintain a certain degree of regulatory autonomy. The Member States
were worried about constantly having to justify national legislation under Article 34
TFEU – even if the legislation had little to do with cross-border trade. In Keck, the
Court of Justice finally attempted to deal with this tension by making a fundamen-
tal distinction between national rules that regulate the physical characteristics of a
product and national rules that regulate the circumstances under which a product
can be sold.28 The former category of rules (‘product requirements’) is caught by
Article 34 TFEU, while the latter category (‘selling arrangements’) falls outside the
scope of Article 34 TFEU.29 The aim of the judgment was to redefine the bound-
aries of the scope of Article 34 TFEU and to protect the regulatory autonomy of the
Member States.
20. The concept of market access constituted one of the key foundations of the
Court’s judgment in Keck. On a first impression, it could be argued that Keck is
consistent with the restrictive approach to market access adopted by the Court in
James Elliott and Schmitt. After all, the focus of the judgment is on the distinction
between national rules that directly affect the access of products to the market – such
as product requirements – and rules that are about the circumstances under which
products are sold. This seems to be based on a similar static interpretation of the
concept of market access, since rules that regulate the sale of a product fall outside
26 ECJ 11 July 1974, C-8/74, Dassonville, ECLI:EU:C:1974:82.
27 ECJ 23 November 1989, C-145/88, Torfaen Borough Council, ECLI:EU:C:1989:584.
28 ECJ 24 November 1993, C-267-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, ECLI:EU:E:1993:905.
29 Ibid., at para. 15.
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the scope of Article 34 TFEU. However, the Court also recognized in Keck that
there might be certain circumstances in which selling arrangements can still
constitute a restriction of Article 34 TFEU. Therefore, the Court developed the
so-called Keck proviso: selling arrangements only fall outside the scope of Article
34 TFEU if they apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory
and so long as they do not discriminate in law or in fact against products from other
Member States.30 The justification for this proviso was that national rules which
comply with both conditions do not prevent or impede access to the market.31 As a
result, it can be seen that the Court relied on the concept of market access in
redefining the scope of application of Article 34 TFEU. The Court recognized that
selling arrangements which discriminated against products from other Member
States could have a negative impact on market access. This reflects a more dynamic
definition of market access, which is not only concerned with the initial placing of
products on the market, but also with rules which govern the conditions under
which a product can be sold.
21. The way in which the Court has applied the Keck proviso in subsequent cases
shows that market access has in fact become the key criterion in determining whether a
selling arrangement falls outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU. Selling arrangements
that prevent or hinder market access were found to be indirectly discriminatory and
had to be justified and proportionate. The main examples of this type of rules are
national rules on advertising. In De Agostini,32 the Court held that a national rule
which restricted the ability of manufacturers to advertise their products could consti-
tute a restriction on free movement. As a result, even though Keck initially seemed to
be consistent with a more static approach to market access, the Keck proviso has
subsequently been interpreted in such a way that it is possible to take national rules
which govern the circumstances under which a product is sold into account in deciding
whether or not there is a restriction on free movement. This has extended the reach of
Article 34 TFEU beyond the initial market access stage. Therefore, the concept of
market access under Article 34 TFEU seems broader than the Court’s concept under
the New Approach. However, Keck and the early post-Keck case law did not focus on
rules which regulated the use of products. For a long time, it was unclear whether
national rules on use could constitute restrictions on free movement.
3.2. Commission v Italy (Trailers)
22. The Court had an opportunity to consider national rules on use in Commission v
Italy (Trailers).33 This case was about Italian rules which prohibited motorcycles from
30 Ibid., at para. 16.
31 Ibid., at para. 17.
32 ECJ 9 July 1997, C-34/95, De Agostini, ECLI:EU:C:1997:344.
33 ECJ 10 February 2009, C-110/05, Commission v Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2009:66.
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towing a trailer. These rules clearly constituted a restriction on the use of trailers in
Italy – more precisely, of those trailers which were specifically designed to be towed by
motorcycles. The initial question for the Court was how such rules should be classified
under Article 34 TFEU. The Commission argued that national rules which have a
negative impact on the use of products should be assessed under the Dassonville test,
while national rules which completely prohibited the use of a product should always be
regarded as a measure having equivalent effect under Article 34 TFEU.34 Some of the
Member States argued that rules on use should be assessed as selling arrangements,
because these rules do not affect the physical characteristics of a product.35 Therefore, if
they complied with the Keck proviso, these rules would fall outside the scope of Article
34 TFEU. This approach was also adopted by Advocate General (‘AG’) Kokott in the
parallel case ofMickelsson and Roos,36 which was about a Swedish ban on the use of jet
skis on Swedish waters. She proposed to classify rules on use as selling arrangements and
to assess them under the Keck test. At the same time, she found that national rules that
completely restricted or banned the use of a product were likely to have a negative
impact on market access and, consequently, did not satisfy the second Keck proviso.
Therefore, the national rule constituted a measure having equivalent effect.
23. The Court did not follow the route suggested by AGKokott in eitherCommission
v Italy orMickelsson and Roos. It developed a separate and self-standing test for rules
that prevent or restrict the use of products. This rule is additional to the Dassonville
test and the Keck proviso for selling arrangements and applies specifically to national
rules on use.37 The Court focussed on the impact of use restrictions on the behaviour
of consumers. Because they make consumers less likely to buy a product, use restric-
tions have a negative impact on the access of the product to the Member State.
According to the Court, ‘[c]onsumers, knowing that they are not permitted to use
their motorcycles with a trailer specially designed for it, have practically no interest in
buying such a trailer’.38 As a result, the Italian legislation ‘prevents a demand from
existing in the market at issue for such trailers and therefore hinders their
importation’.39 InMickelsson and Roos, the Court formulated the test more precisely:
rules on use that prevent or greatly restrict the use of a product for the specific purpose
for which it is intended constitute measures having equivalent effect under Article 34
TFEU.40 As a consequence, such national rules have to be justified and proportionate.
34 Ibid., at para. 18.
35 Ibid., at para. 22.
36 Opinion of AG Kokott, ECJ 14 December 2006, C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos, ECLI:EU:
C:2006:782.
37 For an analysis of the interaction between the different tests, see R. SCHÜTZE, ‘Of Types and Tests:
Towards a Unitary Doctrinal Framework for Article 34 TFEU?’, 41. EL Rev 2016, p 826.
38 C-110/05, Commission v Italy, para. 57.
39 Ibid.
40 ECJ 4 June 2009, C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos, ECLI:EU:C:2009:336, para.28.
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3.3. A Dynamic Concept of Market Access
24. In Commission v Italy (Trailers) and Mickelsson and Roos, the Court adopted
a broad definition of market access. The Court extended the scope of application of
Article 34 TFEU to national rules on use. In doing so, it explicitly recognized that
rules that govern the use of products may have an impact on market access and can
create obstacles to free movement. A direct link was made between market access
and national rules on the use of products. In James Elliott, the Court was unwilling
to make this link for the New Approach. As a result, the scope of the New Approach
does not extend to national legislation that governed the use of a product after it
has been placed on the market. After Commission v Italy (Trailers) and Mickelsson
and Roos, it is clear that the impact of the Irish legislation on implied conditions in
sale of goods contracts could be reviewed under Article 34 TFEU – for example, if
Irish law imposed different or additional standards on foreign products. In Alsthom
Atlantique, the Court held that national contract law rules which applied without
distinction and which did not have the effect of restricting intra-Community trade
did not constitute a measure having equivalent effect under Article 34 TFEU.41
However, this does not exclude the possibility that national rules on the use of
products could discriminate against foreign products or could restrict market
access. The effectiveness of the New Approach would still be improved if EU law
retained control over national rules on use. Therefore, it will be argued below that
the scope of application of the New Approach should be extended, so that the Irish
rules on fitness for purpose would be regulated by the standards of the New
Approach rather than Article 34 TFEU. Before we will analyse the required ‘inten-
sity’ of the EU-law control in the next section, the Court’s justifications for a
dynamic interpretation of market access will be analysed.
25. In its case law under Article 34 TFEU, the Court has interpreted market
access as a process rather than a specific moment.42 It has recognized that market
access is not just achieved by allowing manufacturers to place their products on the
market. Rules which have a negative impact on the use of products after they have
been placed on the market can restrict market access and should, therefore, be
within the scope of Article 34 TFEU. It is helpful to look at the reasons for why the
Court extended the scope of Article 34 TFEU to restrictions on use. It appears that
the Court adopted both a manufacturer- or business-centred perspective and a
consumer-based perspective on market access. In Mickelsson and Roos, the Court
made it clear that national rules that greatly restrict the use of a product effectively
make it useless for manufacturers or importers to import that product.43 After all,
41 ECJ 24 January 1991, C-339/89, Alsthom Atlantique SA, ECLI:EU:C:1991:28.
42 For a more detailed analysis of the concept of market access in free movement law, see J. SNELL,
‘The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan?’, 47. CML Rev 2010, p 437.
43 C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos, para. 26.
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why would manufacturers or importers place a particular product on the market if
the product could hardly be used at all? It is unlikely that there would be any
demand for the product. This is closely linked to the expectations of consumers.
Consumers will not be interested in buying a product if they know that they cannot
use it.44 As a result, the expectations of consumers play an important role in
defining the scope of market access.
26. To conclude, the Court has adopted a significantly broader definition to
market access under Article 34 TFEU than under the New Approach. The result
is that the scope of the New Approach is relatively limited, whilst most national
rules on use – including private law rules – can only be assessed under Article 34
TFEU. This has a negative impact on the effective application of the New
Approach. A dynamic interpretation of market access will help to facilitate market
access and increase the free movement of goods in the EU. Ultimately, the New
Approach will be more successful as a regulatory strategy if its scope is extended
beyond the initial market access stage. This includes the possibility of the New
Approach having an impact on national private law rules.
4. Market Access and Private Law
4.1. A More Integrated Approach to Positive and Negative Integration
27. In the previous section, it was argued that the scope of the New Approach
should be extended to cover national private law rules which have an impact on the
use of products. In the next two sections, we will analyse precisely what impact the
New Approach should have on private law to facilitate market access and to
improve free movement of goods in the internal market. In other words, the
focus will be on how much EU-law control of national private law rules on use is
necessary for the effective application of the New Approach. We will have a closer
look at the question to what extent the effectiveness of the New Approach requires
changes to be made to national contract and tort law. Such an extension of the
scope of the New Approach would inevitably have an impact on the interaction
between positive and negative integration in the field of free movement of goods.
The argument which has been developed above is that the Court should adopt a
similar interpretation of market access under the New Approach to the interpreta-
tion which has been developed under Article 34 TFEU. Essentially, the interpreta-
tion of a concept used in negative integration would be used to extend the scope of
application of positive integration – i.e. the harmonized standards under the New
Approach. For both regulatory strategies, the Court would apply a dynamic inter-
pretation of the concept of market access.
44 Ibid., at para. 27.
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28. On first sight, applying a concept developed under Article 34 TFEU to the
New Approach in order to reduce the scope of application of Article 34 TFEU
might seem paradoxical. However, it makes sense if one takes into account that the
New Approach and Article 34 TFEU serve the same purpose – they both seek to
improve the internal market for goods. Since both strategies play a complementary
role, it does not matter if the scope of the New Approach is extended with the
result that the scope of Article 34 TFEU is restricted. If this is a more effective way
of guaranteeing free movement of goods, such an approach would be justified on
the basis of the common aim to improve the internal market. If the application of
the Irish Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 was assessed under Article
34 TFEU, it would be possible that the Court found a restriction on free movement
if the Irish legislation was held to restrict market access of foreign products. Such a
restriction could still be justified by the Irish State by relying on the express
derogations in Article 36 TFEU, or by relying on one of the mandatory require-
ments developed by the Court. The Irish State would also have to show that the
restriction was suitable and necessary to achieve its aim. If the conclusion was that
the Irish rules could not be justified, Ireland would have to remove the obstacle to
free movement. EU law would not directly dictate what kind of rules should be
adopted to replace the rules that breached Article 34 TFEU. This is precisely why it
is argued that the scope of the New Approach should be extended to cover private
law rules.
29. Under the New Approach, the EU has developed its own set of product
standards that goods have to comply with before they can be placed on the market.
These standards are by their very nature precise and specific. They set out in detail
what the precise technical requirements are that goods have to comply with before
they are presumed fit for use.45 As such, they are suitable to be applied in
contractual disputes in which courts have to assess the fitness for purpose of a
product. Furthermore, the standards developed under the New Approach constitute
total harmonization.46 Although it is possible for manufacturers to establish com-
pliance with the essential requirements through other means than through comply-
ing with the European standard, the essential requirements are the only allowed
standard – it is not possible for Member States to impose higher or additional
standards on products under the New Approach. The effect of the total harmoniza-
tion would be compromised if Member States were entitled to apply different
standards in private law disputes. Therefore, the scope of application of the
standards adopted under the New Approach should be extended to cover private
law disputes. The result would be that the scope of application of the New
Approach and Article 34 TFEU might overlap more regularly. The question of
45 See H. SCHEPEL, Constitution of Private Governance, p 232.
46 This is confirmed by Art. 6(1) of Directive 89/106, discussed above.
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whether the New Approach’s reach should be extended should always be deter-
mined by an assessment of what is the most effective way of guaranteeing market
access in the internal market. Ultimately, a more flexible approach to positive and
negative integration, combined with a dynamic concept of market access, will be
more successful in improving the functioning of the internal market for goods.
30. Two further reasons will be provided for extending the scope of the New
Approach. First, the New Approach will be more effective as a regulatory approach
to facilitate market access if it has an impact on private law rules. In James Elliott
and Schmitt, the Court did not address the question of whether the effectiveness of
the New Approach required that a link be made between market access and private
law rules. In Schmitt, the opportunity was provided through the criteria laid down
in Paul. However, the Court did not apply the second condition laid down in that
case – does the effet utile of the directive require that individuals can claim damages
if the directive has been breached?47 In James Elliott, the questions of the Irish
High Court did not explicitly address the effectiveness of the New Approach.48
However, it would not have been difficult to make this link. It provides a degree of
certainty to manufacturers to know that the European standards with which they
have to comply to place their products on the market are also the standards that are
used to assess whether the products are fit for purpose when they are actually being
used. The artificial distinction between placing goods on the market and the use of
goods does not make sense from the perspective of businesses, because there is a
risk that they might be asked to comply with divergent standards in private law.
Moreover, consumers will be able to know what standards a product should comply
with under a contract for the sale of goods. This is likely to have a positive effect on
consumer confidence and on the willingness of consumers to buy a product.
31. Second, and more fundamentally, extending the impact of the New Approach
to private law rules would be consistent with the way in which the EU has
‘operationalized’ private law as a tool to shape and improve the functioning of
the internal market.49 In the last decades, the EU has increasingly harmonized
aspects of private law by relying on Article 114 TFEU. The very precise contractual
rules in the telecom and energy sectors provide good examples. More generally, the
EU has adopted extensive consumer protection rules, which have a direct impact on
private law. Many of these rules have been interpreted by the Court as total
harmonization.50 Therefore, Member States are not allowed to adopt divergent
47 C-222/02, Peter Paul and others (n 21), paras 42–47.
48 C-613/14, James Elliott (n 1), para. 31.
49 See H. MICKLITZ, ‘The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law: The Transformation of
European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation’, 28. YEL
2009, p 3.
50 See V. MAK, ‘Full Harmonization in European Private Law; A Two-Track Concept’, 20. ERPL
2012, p 213.
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standards. The standards adopted under the New Approach also constitute total
harmonization, but the scope of that harmonization is limited to the initial market
access stage. Furthermore, as a result of the EU’s increasing impact on private law,
the distinction between public and private law in EU law has become less clear.
This has led to what Hans Micklitz has called European regulatory private law – a
corpus of EU rules that have a direct impact on private law relationships.51 This
development has resulted in a process of fusion of public and private law. As a
result, the argument that the scope of the New Approach should not extend beyond
administrative law becomes less convincing. For the New Approach, this means
that the European standards should also have an impact on private law. In the next
sections, we will analyse precisely what impact would be required in cases like
James Elliott and Schmitt – in other words, how the broader argument that the New
Approach should be extended to private law cases works out in practice.
4.2. The New Approach and Liability in Contract Law
32. In James Elliott, the Court of Justice held that the European standard and
Directive 89/106 did not regulate the method through which the conformity of the
product with the contractual requirements imposed by national law would be
established. The national court did not have to use the mechanisms in the
European standard to decide whether the aggregate was fit for purpose and of
merchantable quality.52 Moreover, the national court did not have to apply the
presumption of fitness for use under Directive 89/106 in a contractual dispute in
which it was alleged that the aggregate was not fit for purpose when it was used.53
As a result, the private law consequences of the New Approach are not regulated by
EU law and Member States remain free to apply their own national rules on
presumptions and burden of proof.
33. If it is accepted that the New Approach should have an impact on private law,
there are essentially two strategies that could be used to make the link from the
New Approach to private law. The first strategy could be described as a maximalist
strategy, while the second would be a minimalist strategy. The maximalist strategy
would require that the European standard, which provides the standards with which
a product had to comply to be presumed fit for use under the New Approach, is also
applied as the contractual standard of care. As such, the question of fitness for
purpose would be exclusively decided on the basis of the European standard. The
entire assessment by the national court would have to be based on the European
standard. This would include rules on establishing conformity and presumptions of
51 H. MICKLITZ, 28. YEL 2009.
52 C-613/14, James Elliott (n 1), para. 53.
53 Ibid., at para. 62.
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conformity.54 The only required change in private law would be that the methods
used to establish the conformity or non-conformity of the product with the
European standard would have to be applied at the moment of the use of the
product – not at the moment of the goods being placed on the market. This
maximalist approach would significantly reduce the flexibility of national courts
in contractual disputes. It would limit the possibility to take the individual circum-
stances of a case into account. This is precisely why courts are generally reluctant
to give a decisive role to standards in private law disputes. Therefore, it could be
more effective to impose a strong – but rebuttable – presumption that the European
standard should be applied as the contractual standard of care. Private lawyers
might react to this argument by saying that this is already happening in practice.
National courts often rely on European standards in setting the contractual stan-
dard of care – precisely like the Irish High Court in James Elliott. However, the
difference with the maximalist approach would be that the application of the
standard would be required as a matter of EU law.55 This would bring the case
within the scope of application of EU law, and would make it possible for national
courts to make a preliminary reference. Moreover, the strength of the presump-
tion – i.e. how easy it would be to rebut it – would also be determined by EU law.
34. A second way of extending the reach of the New Approach to private law
could be described as a minimalist strategy, because it would go significantly less
far than the approach described above. With this strategy, if a national court
voluntarily decides to rely on a European standard in establishing the fitness for
purpose of a product in a private law dispute – which is what the Irish courts had
decided to do in James Elliott – , it would have to apply the rules of the European
standard in solving the case. In other words, EU law would not require that the
European standard is used as the contractual standard of care. But if a national
court decides to adopt the European standard for the purpose of establishing the
fitness for purpose of a product, then it has to play by the rules of the European
standard. The impact on national law would be less extensive, because national
courts would still be entitled to apply different standards under national law.
However, if a choice to adopt the European standard was made, then at least the
buyer and seller know that the dispute would be decided in accordance with the
rules of the European standard. No additional set of standards or rules could be
applied. In James Elliott, the standards for fitness for purpose in the European
standard would then have been used to establish whether the implied condition of
fitness for purpose under the Irish Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980
54 These rules were found the harmonized standard EN 13242:2002.
55 Another way of looking at this could be to say that national courts were under a duty of consistent
interpretation to interpret the requirements of the national legislation in line with the European
standard. I am grateful to Mislav Mataija for this suggestion.
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had been complied with.56 The methods for establishing compliance would be those
provided in the European standard, with the exception that the fitness for use
would have to be tested at the moment when the product was being used – not at
the moment when it was placed on the market.
35. From the perspective of market access and free movement of goods, this
second strategy would be less far-reaching and could still lead to divergent stan-
dards being applied in private law. The maximalist approach would be more
attractive from the purpose of guaranteeing compliance with uniform European
standards. However, the second approach would already be a good start to begin to
extend the scope of the New Approach to private law. If, in practice, national courts
already often rely on European standards in contract law disputes, the maximalist
approach would not be necessary to guarantee and to improve the functioning of
the internal market.57 With the minimalist approach, the voluntary application of
European standards in contract law would at least be brought within the scope of
application of EU law.
4.3. The New Approach and Liability in Tort Law
36. In Schmitt, the Court held that the Medical Devices Directive did not give
individuals the right to claim damages from certification bodies which were oper-
ating under the New Approach. The conditions for the liability of certification
bodies were regulated by national law. It has already been argued above that this
conclusion was based on a minimalist reading of the Court’s judgment in Paul.
Although the Court was right to conclude that the Medical Devices Directive did
not include any provisions that indicated that it should be possible to hold certifi-
cation bodies liable under EU law, the more fundamental question of whether the
effective application of the Directive required this was not addressed. If the Court
had applied Paul more broadly, it would have had to assess whether the aims of
facilitating market access and protecting the health of end-users require that end-
users can hold certification bodies liable. This would have required the Court to
analyse what the impact of the potential liability of certification bodies would have
been on the confidence of consumers in buying the product, and also on the health
of consumers, which was expressly identified as one of the aims of the Medical
Devices Directive.58 One of the main reasons why Ms Schmitt had brought a claim
against TÜV, and not against the manufacturer PIP, was that the manufacturer had
gone bankrupt and, therefore, did not provide a reasonable chance of getting
56 Point 6.3 of the harmonized standard EN 13242:2002.
57 For a more detailed discussion of the reliance on European standards by national courts in
contractual disputes, see B. VAN LEEUWEN, European Standardisation of Services, pp 146–155, and
H. SCHEPEL, Constitution of Private Governance.
58 Case 219/15, Schmitt (n 2), para. 52.
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compensation. The negligence claim against TÜV was an alternative to a claim
against the manufacturer.59
37. Overall, the key question is whether the possibility of tort liability of certifica-
tion bodies should be required as a matter of EU law. This requires a broader
assessment of the existing liability rules under EU law. The Product Liability
Directive makes it possible for consumers to claim damages from manufacturers
for damage suffered as a result of defective products.60 However, if the manufac-
turer does not provide a realistic possibility of getting compensation, for example
because they have gone bankrupt, EU law does not provide any alternative means of
redress. In such cases, claimants have to rely on national law. In Schmitt, the Court
held that the Product Liability Directive does not prevent the possibility of addi-
tional fault-based types of liability under national law, but the Court did not analyse
whether the Medical Devices Directive required the possibility of liability under
national law.61 If we focus on the effectiveness of the New Approach, the question
is whether the potential liability of certification bodies in tort would improve
market access and the protection of the health of end-users. First of all, would
EU law liability of certification bodies help to improve consumer confidence?
Would consumers like Ms Schmitt be more confident in buying breast implants if
they knew that they could hold the certification body liable if it had acted negli-
gently in the conformity assessment procedure? The link between the role of
certification bodies under the New Approach and consumer confidence might
seem remote. At the same time, after the PIP scandal, the market for breast
implants received a serious blow, and many women have become less confident in
buying breast implants.62 Therefore, it could be argued that the potential liability
of certification bodies would help to restore confidence of consumers in the quality
of breast implants in the EU. As such, it would increase the use of breast implants
in the internal market. The strength of this argument would also depend on
whether the possibility of liability would actually make certification bodies do a
better job – i.e. whether they would act more diligently because they could poten-
tially be held liable under EU law.
38. Furthermore, there is a close link to the second aim of the Medical Devices
Directive, which is to protect the health of end-users. Would it be necessary to
protect the health of end-users to impose liability of certification bodies under EU
law? Again, this would depend on the extent to which EU law liability would have a
59 The context of and background to the case is discussed in detail in B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014.
60 Directive 85/374 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of
the Member States concerning liability for defective products.
61 Case 219/15, Schmitt (n 2), para. 58. See N. REICH, ‘Product Liability and Beyond: An Exercise in
“Gap-Filling”’, 24. ERPL 2016, p 619.
62 See J. DE BRUYNE & C. VANLEENHOVE, ‘The “Breast-Taking” Consequences of the Poly Implant
Prothèse case’, 24. ERPL 2016, p 823.
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deterrent effect. It could be argued that the Court’s recognition that certification
bodies act to protect end-users is already sufficient to establish a duty of care in tort
in national law. It would then not be necessary to impose this kind of liability under
EU law. Furthermore, after the PIP scandal, the EU has already adopted stricter
rules on the supervision of certification.63 The public supervision of certification
bodies has been strengthened.64 Moreover, the obligations of certification bodies
have been extended – the conformity assessment procedure has become more
onerous.65 These changes have been introduced to protect the health of end-
users. From that perspective, it could be argued that it is not necessary for EU
law to also impose liability in tort on certification bodies. With the extension of
their obligations and the recognition that certification bodies act to protect end-
users the liability of certification bodies in tort could safely be left to national law.
39. Overall, the conclusion could be that the effectiveness of the New Approach
does not require that EU law regulate the conditions under which certification
bodies can be held liable for negligence in the conformity assessment procedure.
However, this question has to be expressly addressed by the Court. In doing so, it
should not just focus on the wording of directives adopted under the New
Approach, but it should also assess the potential liability of certification bodies in
the broader framework for liability established by EU law. It is only after such an
assessment that a conclusion can be drawn as to whether the effectiveness of the
New Approach requires that a link be made between the EU rules on market access
and the liability of certification bodies in tort.
5. Conclusion
40. In general, the Court is not reluctant to rely on the effet utile of EU law to
extend the scope of application of EU law. Nevertheless, in James Elliott and
Schmitt, the Court refused to extend the application of the New Approach to
private law disputes. This is a missed opportunity, because the New Approach
will be more effective in improving the free movement of goods if its ‘reach’ is
extended to private law. Moreover, it would lead to a more harmonious interpreta-
tion of the concept of market access under the New Approach and Article 34 TFEU.
Therefore, the Court should be encouraged to explicitly address the question of
what role private law should play in guaranteeing the effective application of the
New Approach.
41. If the Court is not willing to deal with this question, the private law implica-
tions of the New Approach should be addressed directly by the EU legislature. Rules
63 Regulation 2017/745 on medical devices.
64 Annex VII of Regulation 2017/745.
65 Annex IX of Regulation 2017/745.
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on the application of European standards in contractual disputes could be included
in New Approach directives. Similarly, the directives could include express rules on
the potential liability of certification bodies. In the end, this might be the most
effective way of making a link between the New Approach and private law, which
would lead to a more consistent interpretation of the concept of market access in
the internal market for goods.
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